Theoretical Economics

New submissions

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New submissions for Fri, 17 May 24

[1]  arXiv:2405.09843 [pdf, other]

Title: Organizational Selection of Innovation

Authors: Lucas Böttcher, Ronald Klingebiel

Comments: 40 pages, 13 figures, 2 tables

Subjects: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph); Applications (stat.AP)

Budgetary constraints force organizations to pursue only a subset of possible innovation projects. Identifying which subset is most promising is an error-prone exercise, and involving multiple decision makers may be prudent. This raises the question of how to most effectively aggregate their collective nous. Our model of organizational portfolio selection provides some first answers. We show that portfolio performance can vary widely. Delegating evaluation makes sense when organizations employ the relevant experts and can assign projects to them. In most other settings, aggregating the impressions of multiple agents leads to better performance than delegation. In particular, letting agents rank projects often outperforms alternative aggregation rules -- including averaging agents' project scores as well as counting their approval votes -- especially when organizations have tight budgets and can select only a few project alternatives out of many.

Cross-lists for Fri, 17 May 24

[2]  arXiv:2405.09963 (cross-list from cs.NI) [pdf, other]

Title: Economics of Integrated Sensing and Communication service provision in 6G networks

Authors: Luis Guijarro, Maurizio Naldi, Vicent Pla, Jose-Ramon Vidal

Subjects: Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

In Beyond5G and 6G networks, a common theme is that sensing will play a more significant role than ever before. Over this trend, Integrated Sensing and Communications (ISAC) is focused on unifying the sensing functionalities and the communications ones and to pursue direct tradeoffs between them as well as mutual performance gains. We frame the resource tradeoff between the SAC functionalities within an economic setting. We model a service provision by one operator to the users, the utility of which is derived from both SAC functionalities. The tradeoff between the resources that the operator assigns to the SAC functionalities is analyzed from the point of view of the service prices, quantities and profits. We demonstrate that equilibrium quantities and prices exist. And we provide relevant recommendations for enforcing regulatory limits of both power and bandwidth.

Replacements for Fri, 17 May 24

[3]  arXiv:2405.05744 (replaced) [pdf, ps, other]

Title: Designing Social Learning

Authors: Aleksei Smirnov, Egor Starkov

Subjects: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

[4]  arXiv:2401.09054 (replaced) [pdf, ps, other]

Title: On conditioning and consistency for nonlinear functionals

Authors: Edoardo Berton, Alessandro Doldi, Marco Maggis

Subjects: Mathematical Finance (q-fin.MF); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

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