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Quantum Physics

Title: Quantum Secure Anonymous Communication Networks

Abstract: Anonymous communication networks (ACNs) enable Internet browsing in a way that prevents the accessed content from being traced back to the user. This allows a high level of privacy, protecting individuals from being tracked by advertisers or governments, for example. The Tor network, a prominent example of such a network, uses a layered encryption scheme to encapsulate data packets, using Tor nodes to obscure the routing process before the packets enter the public Internet. While Tor is capable of providing substantial privacy, its encryption relies on schemes, such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman for distributing symmetric keys, which are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks and are currently in the process of being phased out.
To overcome the threat, we propose a quantum-resistant alternative to RSA and Diffie-Hellman for distributing symmetric keys, namely, quantum key distribution (QKD). Standard QKD networks depend on trusted nodes to relay keys across long distances, however, reliance on trusted nodes in the quantum network does not meet the criteria necessary for establishing a Tor circuit in the ACN. We address this issue by developing a protocol and network architecture that integrates QKD without the need for trusted nodes, thus meeting the requirements of the Tor network and creating a quantum-secure anonymous communication network.
Comments: Accepted for publication in QCNC2024
Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI)
Cite as: arXiv:2405.06126 [quant-ph]
  (or arXiv:2405.06126v1 [quant-ph] for this version)

Submission history

From: Stephen DiAdamo [view email]
[v1] Thu, 9 May 2024 22:05:45 GMT (167kb,D)

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