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Economics > Theoretical Economics
Title: The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game
(Submitted on 19 Feb 2024 (v1), last revised 25 Apr 2024 (this version, v2))
Abstract: Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching problems can be reframed as nonzero-sum games between two players, thus generalizing a result from von Neumann. The underlying linear programming structure of TU matching problems, however, is lost when moving to LTU. These results draw a new bridge between non-TU matching problems and the theory of bimatrix games, with consequences notably regarding the computation of stable outcomes.
Submission history
From: Antoine Jacquet [view email][v1] Mon, 19 Feb 2024 15:04:05 GMT (18kb)
[v2] Thu, 25 Apr 2024 15:21:40 GMT (21kb)
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