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Economics > Theoretical Economics

Title: Designing Simple Mechanisms

Authors: Shengwu Li
(Submitted on 27 Mar 2024 (v1), last revised 7 Apr 2024 (this version, v2))
Abstract: Which mechanisms are simple to play? When is it easy for participants to see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible? I will start by explaining how and why economists came to ask these questions. Then I will discuss three recent answers, that capture different aspects of what makes a mechanism simple.
Subjects: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
Cite as: arXiv:2403.18694 [econ.TH]
  (or arXiv:2403.18694v2 [econ.TH] for this version)

Submission history

From: Shengwu Li [view email]
[v1] Wed, 27 Mar 2024 15:43:09 GMT (42kb)
[v2] Sun, 7 Apr 2024 15:57:23 GMT (42kb)
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