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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

Title: SERENE: A Collusion Resilient Replication-based Verification Framework

Abstract: The rapid advancement of autonomous driving technology is accompanied by substantial challenges, particularly the reliance on remote task execution without ensuring a reliable and accurate returned results. This reliance on external compute servers, which may be malicious or rogue, represents a major security threat. While researchers have been exploring verifiable computing, and replication-based task verification as a simple, fast, and dependable method to assess the correctness of results. However, colluding malicious workers can easily defeat this method. Existing collusion detection and mitigation solutions often require the use of a trusted third party server or verified tasks which may be hard to guarantee, or solutions that assume the presence of a minority of colluding servers. We propose SERENE, a collusion resilient replication-based verification framework that detects, and mitigates colluding workers. Unlike state-of-the-art solutions, SERENE uses a lightweight detection algorithm that detects collusion based on a single verification task. Mitigation requires a two stage process to group the workers and identifying colluding from honest workers. We implement and compare SERENE's performance to Staab et. al, resulting in an average of 50\% and 60\% accuracy improvement in detection and mitigation accuracy respectively.
Comments: 9 pages
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI)
Cite as: arXiv:2404.11410 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2404.11410v2 [cs.CR] for this version)

Submission history

From: Amir Esmaeili [view email]
[v1] Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:11:31 GMT (1412kb,D)
[v2] Thu, 18 Apr 2024 15:30:51 GMT (1412kb,D)

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